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Abstract: According to Husserl, the epochè (or suspension of judgment) must be left 
incomplete. It is to be performed step by step, thus defining various layers of 
“reduction”. In phenomenology at least two such layers can be distinguished: the life-
world reduction, and the transcendental reduction. Quantum physics was born from a 
particular variety of the life-world reduction: reduction to observables according to 
Heisenberg, and reduction to classical-like properties of experimental devices according 
to Bohr. But QBism has challenged this limited version of the phenomenological 
reduction advocated by the Copenhagen interpretation. QBists claim that quantum 
states are “expectations about experiences of pointer readings”, rather than expectations 
about pointer positions. Their focus on lived experience, not just on macroscopic 
variables, is tantamount to performing the transcendental reduction instead of stopping 
at the relatively superficial layer of the life-world reduction. I will show that quantum 
physics indeed gives us several reasons to go the whole way down to the deepest variety 
of phenomenological reduction, may be even farther than the standard QBist view: not 





Quantum mechanics was born from a quick and thorough ontological 
tabula rasa, between the years 1924 and 1926, just after the ontological 
patchwork that characterized the birth of quantum theory from 1900 to 
1924. There were two versions of the tabula rasa: replacing an old 
ontology with a new one, or permanently suspending ontologies. De 
Broglie and Schrödinger proposed to substitute a new ontology that 
included their so-called “matter waves”, for the old corpuscular 
ontology. Heisenberg was more radical when he introduced his matrix 
mechanics of 1925. He performed the well-known “reduction to 
observables”, namely a reduction of the representational scaffolding of 
the new theory to the variables that can be directly measured in atoms: 
the frequencies and intensities of spectral lines. Heisenberg thereby 
suspended traditional ontologies without replacing them with anything. 
As for Bohr, he advocated a sort of middle way between replacing and 
suspending ontologies. On the one hand he held on to the idea of 
“quantum objects” that can be approached by complementary 
representations. Yet, on the other hand, he tended to reduce physics to 
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what can be handled in a laboratory or said in dialogues between 
scientists. This is what he implied by declaring that quantum theory is 
nothing else and nothing more than a “symbolism” to predict 
experimental phenomena.  
In Bohr’s own terms,  
 
“The quantum-mechanical formalism … represents a purely symbolic 
scheme permitting only predictions, on lines of the correspondence principle, 
as to results obtainable under conditions specified by means of classical 
concepts.”2 
“The appropriate physical interpretation of the symbolic quantum-
mechanical formalism amounts only to predictions, of determinate or 
statistical character, pertaining to individual phenomena appearing under 
conditions defined by classical physical concepts.”3  
 
But let’s come back to Heisenberg’s radical move. The word 
“reduction”, often used to characterize Heisenberg’s strong version of 
the ontological tabula rasa, is obviously reminiscent of the various 
phenomenological reductions. Heisenberg himself did not use this word 
in his pioneering paper of 1925. However, he performed two gestures 
that have a strong phenomenological flavor. Firstly, he ruled out the 
clumsy compromise of the old quantum theory, in which quantum rules 
were associated to semi-classical pictures. And, secondly, he decided 
to: “…establish a theoretical quantum mechanics, analogous to 
classical mechanics, but in which only relations between observable 
quantities occur.” 4  
Beyond the disputable use of the word “reduction”, the two-steps 
structure of Heisenberg’s reasoning irresistibly evokes the dynamics of 
phenomenological reduction. Heisenberg started with suspending his 
belief in former pictures or former ontologies. And he then redirected 
attention towards the epistemic acts of measurement and symbolization. 
These two steps closely correspond to the succession of: (i) a 
phenomenological epochè, and (ii) a reflective move towards the 
reduced domain. 
 
Are epochè and reduction the same thing? 
 
Before I develop this parallel in more details, let me give some 
precisions about the crucial method of phenomenology. It combines 
 
2 Bohr (1987, p. 41) 
3 Bohr (1987, p. 64) 
4 Heisenberg (1925) 
 3 
epochè and reduction. But are epochè and reduction two distinct 
operations indeed, or just two names for a single one?  
Many authors consider that there is no distinction to be drawn 
between the concepts of epochè and reduction in Husserl’s 
phenomenology. They claim that “Husserl never succeeded in 
clarifying the relation between epochè and reduction”5, or, even worse, 
that any distinction is in vain since “The epochè and the 
phenomenological reduction, as epistemological instantiations, are 
synonymous”6.  
Yet Husserl was unambiguous about the fact that epochè and 
reduction represent two distinct steps in the subtle methodological 
approach to phenomenological inquiry.  
The epochè, to start with, is a phase of neutralization of our natural 
belief in the objects that are referred to by nouns in ordinary language. 
In Husserl’s terms, “This universal depriving of acceptance, this 
‘inhibiting’ or ‘putting out of play’ of all positions taken toward the 
objective world ... [is called the] ‘phenomenological Epochè’.”7 But 
such depriving of acceptance is not tantamount to explicit refusal; such 
putting out of play is not tantamount to denial. We must not forget that 
Husserl was careful to avoid any confusion between his position and 
skepticism, from which he nevertheless borrowed the Greek word 
“epochè” : “I am not negating this world as though I were a Sophist; I 
am not doubting its factual being as though I were a skeptic; rather I am 
exercising the phenomenological epochè which shuts me off from any 
judgment about spatio-temporal factual being.”8 The external world of 
objective things is neither asserted nor negated, the natural ontological 
attitude is neither endorsed nor rejected, and such neutral stance is 
precisely the epochè.  
But how far should we push this cultivated neutrality, this radical 
inhibition of our spontaneous tendency to believe in the independent 
existence of what we can perceive and manipulate? Should we seek a 
universal epochè, in which we would live beyond belief and doubt 
about everything, including our own ego 9 ? According to Husserl, 
phenomenology does not require us to go that far. In fact, 
phenomenology qua new science of the transcendental realm, would 
not even be possible if we did not set limits to the epochè. “With good 
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reason, we limit the universality of the epochè. (If we did not) no 
province would be left for unmodified judgments, to say nothing of a 
province for science.”10  
The epochè must stop at the precise point where it meets the 
“province” that the phenomenologist wants to submit to careful 
scrutiny; namely the domain to which the objects of ordinary perception 
and ordinary action are reduced. This “province” to which everything 
else is reduced should not be put out of play in turn, as this would hinder 
attempts to turn it into a proper theme for a new kind of 
(phenomenological) knowledge.  
These two steps of the phenomenological practice, the epochè that 
prepares reduction, and the reduction itself, are carefully distinguished 
in many texts of Husserl. Just consider these sentences: “I must put 
(objective nature) out of action, in order to achieve a reduction to the 
pure psychic realm”; “I must reduce the objective experience to its 
purely subjective being. For this, I have to submit the objective world 
to the epochè.” 11  Here, the epochè is defined as the preliminary 
suspension whose finality is some sort of phenomenological reduction.  
But this implies that the point at which the epochè is stopped can 
vary according to the type and depth of the phenomenological inquiry 
one wishes to perform. This gives rise to various reductions, at various 
levels of our psychic life. As Husserl stated, “(the) operation (of 
epochè) will be divided into different steps of ‘putting out of action’, 
‘parenthesizing’; therefore, our method will assume the characteristic 
of a step-by-step reduction. For this reason, we shall, on most occasions, 
speak of phenomenological reductions.”12 In other terms, the variety of 
points at which the epochè can be stopped define several steps of the 
reduction, several reductions. 
 
Lifeworld reduction and transcendental reduction 
 
In his Crisis of the European Sciences, Husserl individualized at least 
two steps in this process (although there are many others): (1) the life-
world reduction, and (2) the transcendental reduction.  
To perform the life-world reduction, one suspends any belief in the 
abstract theoretical entities of the natural sciences, and sticks to the 
concrete objects of everyday speech and manipulations. Now, what is 
the precise border between the life-world and the domain of science? 
 
10 Husserl (2016, §32)  
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Or, in Bas Van Fraassen’s terms, what is the border between the 
observable and the unobservable? Husserl starts with saying that the 
lifeworld is identical with the standard furniture of ordinary life, seen 
in a purely prescientific light13. But he soon extends it to the furniture 
of scientific laboratories. Once the lifeworld reduction is performed, 
one no longer speaks in terms of electrons, quantum fields, etc. but 
rather in terms of heated metals, reflective cavities, detectors, etc. The 
scientific instruments and the vocabulary of experimental activity are 
retained on the side of the lifeworld, and therefore taken at face value, 
whereas any object allegedly referred to by theoretical symbols falls 
under the epochè. “For a physicist, Husserl writes, the lifeworld is the 
world in which he sees his measuring instruments, he listens the beats 
from his chronometers, he evaluates the magnitudes he observed, and 
so on.”14 
This layer of the phenomenological reduction, the lifeworld 
reduction extended to laboratory life, is incomplete. For it only leads us 
to the domain of our collective conventions; it leads us to the set of 
items and situations one can easily communicate about, be they inside 
or outside the laboratory. But such lifeworld reduction has a high 
methodological value for science. It proves easy to apply to physics, 
and especially to quantum physics, since it just documents the shift 
between the attitude of an abstract theoretician who tends to grant a 
high ontological value to her formal entities, and the attitude of a down-
to-earth physicist who is permanently aware that experiments are the 
soil on which any theoretical claim relies. At any rate, the lifeworld 
reduction is exactly the kind of reduction that was documented in 
Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s works: withdrawal from pictures inspired 
from previous theories, and adhesion to the visible objects or events in 
labs, described in terms that are intersubjectively communicable. 
At first sight, the alternative reduction, i.e. the transcendental 
reduction, looks completely irrelevant to physics. Performing the 
transcendental reduction is a highly demanding task of digging below 
the level of everyday and laboratory conventions. Here, one suspends 
not only the explicit belief in theoretical entities, but also the implicit 
beliefs that are conveyed by ordinary language, and crystallized in the 
perception of ordinary objects. Once this has been done, what is left is 
only the flux of lived experience, with both its perceptive and 
intellectual aspects. The task of a Husserlian phenomenologist is then 
to examine how our ordinary conceptions of the world and the standard 
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entities of ordinary life are “constituted” out of this ground; just in the 
same way as one may inquire into whether it is possible to “constitute” 
the theoretical entities of science out of the body of evidence gathered 
at the mesoscopic scale of the laboratory.   
But the challenge is even more daunting in the case of the 
transcendental reduction than in the case of the lifeworld reduction. For, 
when the transcendental reduction is performed, even the standard 
conditions for mutual understanding and intersubjective agreement 
about the enduring things that can be shown and manipulated, are 
suspended15. 
 
Early signs of the need for transcendental deduction:  experience, 
consciousness and quantum mechanics 
 
Despite this challenge, signs that the transcendental reduction might 
be required by quantum physics, beyond the life-world reduction, are 
visible in various texts of its creators, and in some formulations of its 
so-called “paradoxes”.  
Bohr thus often referred to human experience, not only to pointer 
readings. That this (allegedly idealist) aspect of Bohr’s thought has 
been played down in standard texts of the “Copenhagen school”, and 
finally overshadowed in his later writings, might be due to the pressure 
of Soviet physicists who had to pay tribute to dialectic materialism16. 
But these historical circumstances cannot hide entirely the importance 
Bohr ascribed to human lived experience. Just read the following 
sentences: “When speaking of a conceptual framework, we refer merely 
to the  unambiguous logical representation of relations between 
experiences”17 ; “Science [aims] at the development of general methods 
for ordering common  human experience.”18 It is true that “common 
human experience” can be conveniently expressed in terms of nouns 
and predicates referring to mesoscopic objects, and thereby neglected 
in favor of the familiar life-world. But at the end of the day, the 
benchmark of physics is to be found within single lived experiences in 
which the expectations derived from theoretical calculations are 
confronted with perceived pointer readings. Lived experience is the 
terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of physics. In many cases this 
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is almost too trivial to be noticed; but in quantum physics, this might 
well have a crucial importance. 
The measurement problem of quantum mechanics has been a 
revelator of this non-trivial role of lived experience. But the way this 
role has been expressed is usually flawed, not to say fanciful, because 
it relies on a disputable set of ontological presuppositions: (1) that 
conscious experience is either something or a property of something; 
and (2) that the physical systems and processes postulated by physics 
are things that exist out there, independently of consciousness. The 
standard way of introducing conscious experience in the measurement 
problem indeed implies a form of dualism. It implies there are two 
items, physical systems plus states on the one side, and conscious 
experiences on the other side. Accordingly, conscious experiences are 
ascribed the task of suddenly modifying the state of physical systems; 
of suddenly “collapsing” these “states” from superpositions to sharp 
values19. And the reason why conscious experiences are granted this 
uncanny ability is that they do not belong to the set of quantum objects 
whose “state” is liable to superposition; or, may be, that their nature is 
non-physical altogether.  
 
Transcendental philosophy at work in quantum physics: Von 
Neumann and Everett 
 
Apart from this dualistic caricature, some more nuanced (and 
phenomenology-compatible) approaches of the role of lived experience 
have been formulated from the very beginning of the history of the 
measurement problem. Unfortunately, they have been discarded too 
quickly because, to philosophically unsophisticated minds, they look 
like varieties of dualism. Let me give two examples.  
Von Neumann’s formulation of the measurement problem of 
quantum mechanics is paradigmatic. It is usually believed that Von 
Neumann was the first thinker to introduce the strange idea that 
consciousness is able to modify physical states by collapsing them from 
superpositions to sharp values. But in fact, his position was much more 
subtle, and mostly in tune with phenomenology. His key sentence is the 
following : “No matter how far we calculate – to the mercury vessel, to 
the scale of the thermometer, to the retina, or into the brain, at some 
time we must say: and this is perceived by the observer.”20 According 
to von Neumann, the measurement problem cannot be solved by just 
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evoking some physical event that occurs in the brain of the observer at 
the end of a measuring interaction. For such event would remain “inside 
the (quantum) calculation” and would therefore do nothing to break the 
chain of entanglements and superpositions. But von Neumann does not 
make use of some non-physical entity either. He does not claim that 
there exists some ghostly “thing” or “property” called “consciousness” 
that is able to magically collapse physical states due to its non-physical 
nature. What he mentions is only a change in the level of description, 
that accounts for the difference between a superposition and a sharp 
eigenstate. From a neutral mode of description, one switches to a 
situated mode of description. The view from nowhere of a theoretician 
is replaced with a view from somewhere (the view of someone engaged 
in the ongoing measuring process, and able to witness its outcome). 
Someone who adopts the view from nowhere is bound to use the 
superposition of states, while someone who adopts the view from 
somewhere is led to use the sharp eigenstate instead, for the same sake 
of predicting the outcomes of future measurements.  No miracle occurs 
here, but only a change in one’s self-ascribed epistemological status: 
from anonymous predictor to specific observer, from a neutral stance to 
a situated view. Both state vectors (superposed and sharp) can be used 
alternatively by one and the same person, according to her needs: either 
providing a weighted list of possible experiences available to anyone, 
or indicating the actual experience of someone. 
This non-substantialist construal of observers and their 
consciousness is confirmed by von Neumann’s use of the quasi-
Husserlian expression “abstract ego” (Husserl would have written 
“transcendental ego”). According to von Neumann, the divide between 
the observer and the observed system can be moved back further and 
further until nothing (not even a brain, not even a ghostly soul) is left 
on the observer’s side. It can be moved until the observer is represented 
only by her “abstract ego”, namely by a pure knower unknowable to 
itself, whereas all the rest is treated as a global (quantum) system. This 
procedure clearly precludes any reification of the observer’s residue. 
What is left on the observer’s side is no particular thing, even though it 
is not nothing. It is a pure, fleeting, present experience of perceiving.  
Something similar can be found in Everett’s interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. Everett’s crucial move consists not so much in 
adding one more element to the measurement chain (say a physical 
observer or, may be, a recording robot), as in appending a new symbol 
to its state. The new symbol is a “memory bracket”, that contains a list 
of memories of the measurement outcomes which have been observed 
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and recorded in the past by an observer. In Everett’s formulas, there are 
as many memory brackets as there are terms in the entangled 
superposition of the global state vector of the measurement chain. So, 
each memory bracket is supposed to hold not in the absolute, but only 
relative to the corresponding term. In the many-world re-interpretation 
of Everett’s interpretation, this relativity is made even more concrete, 
since it is claimed that each memory bracket holds within the world that 
corresponds to this term.  
However, the mere addition of a symbol to each term of the 
superposition is not sufficient by itself to solve the measurement 
problem, since no collapse is triggered by it. What really does the trick 
is the situated meaning ascribed to the symbol “memory bracket”. The 
measurement problem is arguably solved when one endorses the 
following kind of statement: 
 “From my observer’s point of view, in my experience, it appears that 
a sharp outcome has been obtained, even though from the standpoint 
of distanciated predictors, the initial superposed state is still valid”. 
So, the solution of the measurement problem here arises from full 
awareness that one occupies an idiosyncratic situation, and that this 
situation self-manifests in one’s own lived experience of some 
particular measurement outcome. Here again (as in von Neumann) 
consciousness does nothing to the physical world. Instead, the so-called 
“events of the physical world” are reinterpreted as a handy way to 
express the common focus of the expectations and observations of 
situated agents endowed with conscious experiences. 
 
The transcendental reduction of QBism 
 
Yet, the most consistent phenomenological approach of quantum 
mechanics is presumably QBism21. QBism is an acronym for “Quantum 
Bayesianism”. According to QBism, “state” vectors are just 
probabilistic valuations, in a Bayesian sense. They are not statements 
about what is the case, but statements about what each agent can 
reasonably expect to be the case. Ultimately, they are mere expressions 
of subjective guesses; they express subjective agent’s willingness to 
place bets about each outcome. Hence the alternative expression 
“Quantum Bettabilitarianism”.  
A feature that makes QBism definitely akin to phenomenology is that 
it adopts a deliberately first-person standpoint (be it first-person 
singular or first-person plural). The project of both phenomenology and 
 
21 Fuchs et al. (2014); Von Baeyer (2016)  
 10 
QBism is to reconstruct the so-called objective knowledge, by starting 
afresh from the first-person standpoint of knowers or agents. Just as 
good phenomenologists, QBist thinkers suspend judgment about a 
presumably external domain of objects: they perform a strong variety 
of Husserl’s epochè. Indeed, in QBism, the symbols of quantum 
theories are no longer supposed to refer to objects, nor are they 
supposed to denote predicates of objects. Then, since the attention of 
QBists is no longer absorbed by claims about objects, it is reflectively 
redirected towards the epistemic function and the practical use of the 
symbols of quantum mechanics. QBists focus on the fact that the 
symbols of quantum mechanics are primarily used by agents to assign 
probabilistic weights to (agent’s future experiences of) various 
outcomes of experiments, so as to make consistent bets about them.  
This reflective move that comes after the epochè, this focusing on the 
agent’s activity of anticipation and probability ascription, is clearly akin 
to Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. But which kind of reduction? 
The very way we have formulated the QBist’s reflective move suggests 
an answer. Probabilities bear on future experiences (not just on future 
pointer positions), and anticipation is a mental activity (not just a set of 
symbols written on a blackboard). The QBist reduction is thus, 
unambiguously, a form of transcendental reduction. 
Chris Fuchs himself clearly states that his reduction cannot be 
restricted to the kind of lifeworld reduction that Bohr advocated. As 
alluded to out earlier, he insists that his starting point and unique theme 
is the lived experience of agents. According to QBism, the quantum 
“state” has no direct representational bearing on physical processes; it 
is a symbolic tool within “a calculus for gambling on each agent’s own 
experience.” 22  This confirms that QBism arises from an act of 
“transcendental reduction” in Husserl’s sense.  
Moreover, this act of transcendental reduction motivates a highly 
non-standard ontology. In Chris Fuchs’ terms, “I do think we have a 
kind of direct evidence of ‘the real’. It is in the very notion of experience 
itself.”23 A plausible interpretation of this latter sentence is that only in 
experience do we know directly “reality”. Indeed, in experience we 
know reality by acquaintance, rather than by distanciating ourselves 
from it. What may look strange from a naturalistic standpoint is that 
such acquainted reality is neither a “reality out there” nor some “inner 
reality” but just a present overarching reality. Reality is a continuum we 
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partake of, not something we contemplate from without or something 
we encapsulate within. 
This idea is in tune with the very spirit of phenomenology, and 
especially with phenomenological ontologies. The typical claim of 
phenomenological ontologies is that Being is strictly coextensive to 
Appearing. The list of quotations of phenomenologists who support it, 
is almost inexhaustible. Accordingly, this premise has been 
transformed into a slogan by the main lineage of contemporary French 
phenomenologists, from Michel Henry to Jean-Luc Marion and Renaud 
Barbaras: “autant d’apparaître, autant d’être.”24 Such slogan is usually 
translated into English as follows: “something is inasmuch as it 
appears”. But the latter translation is ambiguous, because it sounds as 
if there were something whose appearance is the criterion of Being. The 
true premise of phenomenology differs considerably from this 
interpretation. Indeed, according to it, being is nothing above and 
beyond appearing, nothing above and beyond experience. It is true that 
there is also a phenomenological sense of the transcendence of things 
with respect to their appearing; but this feeling of transcendence is self-
generated by the very structure of appearance, and it is therefore aptly 
called “transcendence in immanence”. As Eugen Fink wrote 
unambiguously, “(Phenomenology) simply claims that being is 
identical with the phenomenon.”25 Similarly, according to Heidegger, 
“Being means appearing”; “Appearing does not mean something 
derivative, which from time to time meets up with Being. Being 
essentially unfolds as appearing.”26 
 
Back to the lifeworld reduction (for the moment) 
 
Of course, granting such privilege to transcendental reduction over 
the life-world reduction in the domain of physics, raises difficult issues. 
Indeed, after the epochè has been pushed to a level that enables one to 
perform the transcendental reduction, the basic entities that are usually 
presupposed by the discourse of physicists are suspended, they are “put 
out of action”; and, therefore, the conditions for intersubjective 
agreement between physicists are no longer available. These object-like 
conditions for intersubjective agreement must then be stated explicitly. 
But how can this be done?  
 
24 Henry (1991) 
25 Fink (1994, p. 120)  
26 Heidegger (1980, p. 109)  
 12 
David Mermin proposed to proceed as follows: “Although I cannot 
enter your mind to experience your own private perceptions, you can 
affect my perceptions through language. When I converse with you or 
read your books and articles in Nature, I plausibly conclude that you 
are a perceiving being rather like myself, and infer features of your 
experience.”27  This is fine. But, here again, we must not forget that our 
mutual understanding through language is based on the shared 
assumption of the ordinary objects of our direct perception, 
denomination, and predication. In other terms, it is based on the level 
of life-world reduction, not on the level of transcendental reduction. 
And when we try to evoke the level of “pure experience”, it is by way 
of an essentially allegoric language that uses comparisons with the 
domain of ordinary perceptions and ordinary life. So, even though 
QBism is phenomenologically right to claim that the de jure basis of 
scientific knowledge is personal lived experience and verbal 
communication between subjects of experience, it should also 
recognize that the de facto basis of quantum physics is Bohr’s classical-
like domain of ordinary objects and instruments. This would avoid 
several difficulties in the discourse of QBism.  
Indeed, whereas one can say that living always involves anticipating 
what may come next in experience, probability assignments do not 
reduce to anticipations of this elementary kind. Unlike perceptive 
anticipations, probability assignments are formalized anticipations, and 
these formalized anticipations bear on highly elaborated types (rather 
than tokens) of experiences. Such types of experiences are most 
conveniently expressed in terms of classical-like predicates of 
instruments. For example, one would say: “I have observed that the 
Stern-Gerlach pointer was on ‘up’ position”; or “I ascribe probability 
½ to the ‘up’ pointer-reading in this Stern-Gerlach experiment”. “I 
observe” and “I ascribe” concern personal experiences and choices, but 
what comes after the words “that” and “to” is bound to use ordinary 
language and classical-like presuppositions. For this is the only way to 
reach the domain of what is common to all agents.  
Moreover, when one is asked to explain the structure of the quantum 
probabilistic predictions, one must go beyond the purely subjectivistic 
option of QBism. Let me take an example. Why do we predict 
interference patterns on a screen after a double-slit device? The 
standard explanation is that there must be waves “out there”, that self-
interfere along the two paths made available by the double-slit device; 
and that these real waves are represented by the wave-functions of 
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quantum mechanics. But there is an alternative, non-realist explanation. 
This alternative explanation is that it can be shown that wave-like 
appearances are bound to be forecasted, whenever a probabilistic 
prediction bears on contextual phenomena28. Here, the gist of the new 
explanation is neither to be found in “outer reality” nor in “the inner 
recesses of subjects”, but somewhere in between. It relies on the 
interface between the outer and inner, on the fact that phenomena are 
relative to what triggers them (the experimental context), on the 
creative activity of agents who use specific types of devices to explore 
their cryptic environment. It is then clear that no personal arbitrariness 
is involved in the quantum form of probabilistic predictions; no 
“subjectivity” in the ordinary and narrow sense of something purely 
private, of something that only holds for someone. To formulate 
predictions about phenomena, a physicist follows rules (or norms) that 
take into account the whole experimental pattern. And this experimental 
pattern is described (as Bohr would have it) in ordinary language plus 
classical terminology. To recapitulate, the privilege given to 
transcendental reduction in QBism cannot entirely bypass the relevance 
of the more moderate life-world reduction for explanation and 
justification.  
 
On the necessity of practicing the transcendental reduction 
 
But then, why does QBism pays so little attention to the life-world 
reduction and rather stick to the transcendental reduction? Is this latter 
kind of reduction really indispensable for the clarification of quantum 
mechanics? I definitely think so. There are several reasons in quantum 
mechanics for performing the transcendental reduction beyond the life-
world reduction. And, taken together, these reasons appear extremely 
compelling.  
The first reason is Wigner’s friend so-called “paradox”, which 
appears as a mystery in a realist framework, which remains a mystery 
after one has performed the life-world reduction, but which is 
immediately dissolved once the transcendental reduction has been 
performed in the wake of QBism.  
To understand the QBists’ reading of Wigner’s friend thought 
experiment, we must start with examining once again the QBist view 
of quantum “state vectors”. As we now realize, in QBism, the quantum 
“state” has no direct bearing on physical processes; it is a symbol for 
 
28 Destouches-Février (1951) 
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gambling on agent’s experiences29. This entails that (i) the reduction of 
the “state” represents no “physical” process, and (ii) in the process of 
quantum “gambling”, lived experience plays the role of the most 
universal presupposition, rather than being taken for some airy 
additional ingredient grafted onto a world fundamentally made of 
physical objects. As a consequence, in QBism, there is nothing like an 
“objective reduction of the physical state”; there is only a change in 
expectations (a change in the dispositions to bet) that takes into account 
previous experiences of measurement outcomes.  
So, let’s acknowledge that, in QBism, quantum symbols, and 
especially state vectors, bear exclusively on experiences. Let’s 
aknowledge that they bear on experiences’ being expected or being felt, 
on their being conceived as possible or their being sensed as real, and 
nothing else. It is then trivial to understand why Wigner (who is outside 
the laboratory) does not use the same state vector as his friend (who is 
inside the laboratory). This is due to a difference between the 
informational bases on which those two researchers endowed with lived 
experience rely for elaborating their optimal bets about future 
experiences. “One statement refers to the friend’s potential experiences, 
and one refers to Wigner’s own”30. Since nothing else than conscious 
experience is involved in the symbols of quantum physics, no action of 
conscious experience on something else must be called upon to account 
for sudden changes in these symbols. What accounts for such changes 
is just that conscious beings modify their dispositions to bet, according 
to the information they have retrieved in their conscious minds.  
If we had stopped the epochè at some upper level, say by performing 
the life-world reduction without performing the transcendental 
reduction, Wigner’s friend thought experiment would have been much 
more difficult to account for. In this case, we would have had to find a 
reason, in the mesoscopic domain of experimental devices and 
laboratory activities, why only one of the two state vectors is valid. 
Either Wigner’s superposed state vector holds, or his friend’s sharp 
state vector holds, but not both of them. The standard, Copenhagen-like, 
explanation of this difference in validity between the two state vectors, 
is that a series of irreversible events occurred earlier in the experimental 
apparatus, yielding the stabilization of a pointer reading which thereby 
indicate a sharp value. In such case, the sharp state ascribed by 
Wigner’s friend to the measurement chain (that includes the “physical 
system” and the apparatus) reflects the real state of the mesoscopic 
 
29 Fuchs (2010) 
30 Ibid.  
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furniture of the laboratory. This particular state is deemed to be real 
because it expresses an intersubjectively valid configuration; a 
configuration that can be communicated by and to human observers 
using ordinary language plus classical concepts.  
By contrast, the superposed state ascribed by Wigner to the same 
measurement chain that includes his friend is said to reflect Wigner’s 
ignorance of the real state of what is inside the laboratory. But if this is 
so, Wigner’s superposed state should bear the mark of the said 
ignorance. It should become a statistical mixture, rather than remaining 
a superposition.  
 
Decoherence and the persistent relevance of the transcendental 
reduction 
 
The physicists’ hope was that the transition from a full-blown 
superposition to a statistical mixture could be derived from the quantum 
formalism, together with some thermodynamical considerations. And, 
to a certain extent, they have achieved this successfully by way of the 
decoherence procedure; but to a limited extent only. Decoherence was 
meant to bridge the gap between the quantum domain of superpositions 
and the classical domain of sharp properties, by way of “environment-
induced superselection”31. The principle of this solution consists in 
showing that the phase coherences of the state vector (or the density 
operator) of an apparatus correlated to a micro-system are rapidly 
diluted in its vast environment. Indeed, the virtually complete 
disappearance of the interference terms is equivalent to a superselection 
rule by which one only retains the eigenstates of a given observable. 
But beware: such superselection is always incomplete. For the 
interference terms do not entirely disappear; they just become 
negligible. And these interference terms can even recur in the very long 
run. Decoherence then yields an “improper” statistical mixture, rather 
than a “proper” one 32 . State vector evolution does not “properly” 
describe the advent of a set of sharp properties of objects, that would be 
typical of the lifeworld’s “natural” ontology. Even after decoherence, 
state vectors persistently denote in principle (if not in practice) the 
suspension of any determination, and the relativity of present 
determinations to an act of cognizance that will manifest in future 
experience. Even after decoherence, quantum symbols bear the mark of 
their limited status: they do not describe present intrinsic 
 
31 Zurek (2003) 
32 D’Espagnat (2003) 
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determinations; they are just meant to predict (probabilistically) future 
events suspended to future experimental activities and to future acts of 
cognizance.  
It then turns out that any discourse bearing on present ordinary 
properties and objects of our everyday environment, which is typical of 
the lifeworld reduction, is bound to remain an approximation in the 
quantum domain. And that the reference to future lived experiences, to 
future conscious acts of cognizance, cannot be completely avoided. The 
life-world reduction (to the laboratory furniture) must be 
complemented by a transcendental reduction (to pure awareness of 
laboratory activities and outcomes), if we are to make sense of the 
incompleteness of decoherence.  
Let me recapitulate what I take to be the teaching of (the limits of) 
decoherence. In the quantum domain, there is no certainty inscribed 
“out there” in the heart of things, of which we would simply be aware 
or ignorant. The only true certainties are lying within our experience; 
they arise in our experience either ahead of events, or on the occasion 
of our being acquainted with them. The first form of certainty (ahead of 
events) is expressed by the probability 1 we now ascribe to some future 
measurement result, meaning that we are presently ready to bet our life 
on it. And the second form of certainty (on the occasion of our 
acquaintance with events) bears on what we are living in the present 
moment (be it in a laboratory or in everyday life).  
No delegation of the certainty of experience to the objects of 
experience has ever proved unshakable. This is precisely what Husserl 
pointed out while he was practicing the transcendental reduction. 
Whereas consciousness is the “realm of absolute being”33, he wrote, the 
objects of our everyday environment only “claim being”34; for, whereas 
consciousness is just given at once, the objects of our everyday 
environment are presented incompletely through partial aspects, 
profiles, or “adumbrations”. 
 
Doubts about “objective facts”: an incentive to perform the 
transcendental reduction 
 
We have just documented two kinds of certainties lying within our 
experiences: certainty about the present reasons of our guesses bearing 
on the future, and certainty about the intuitive presence of 
contemporary events. But what about our past? Are we not more certain 
 
33 Husserl (2016, §76) 
34 Husserl (1995, First meditation §8) 
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of our past than of anything else? Isn’t the word “fact”, derived from 
the latin past participle “factum”, a perfect expression of this kind of 
certainty? Let’s inquire a little further. How can we be so sure of our 
past? First and foremost, there is our certainty of memories. Memories 
are experiences; they are often vivid present experiences of which we 
are just as certain as of any other present lived experience. However, 
the content of our memory is by no means as certain as the memory 
itself; not only because there are “false memories”, but also because 
there are wrong interpretations. So, our convictions about the past must 
also rely on another type of certainty.  
Strangely enough, our convictions about the past rely on a reasonable 
amount of anticipation of our future. On the basis of our memories, we 
assume that in the future we’ll find a bundle of traces, recordings, and 
reports that will confirm the descriptive content of such memories. We 
would sometimes bet our lives that further recordings will be consistent 
with our present memories. But, of course, this kind of confirmation is 
not always obtained. Our expectations about recordings, traces, and 
reports can be disappointed. And from then on, the past is no longer 
what it was.  
Now, what about the opposite case where our expectations about 
recordings and newly rediscovered archives are indeed fulfilled? In the 
classical paradigm, this confirmation would be sufficient to bring back 
absolute certainty about the past. For, in the classical paradigm, even if 
we are not entirely confident about the descriptive content of our 
memories, we can at least be absolutely sure of the properties and 
objects of the life-world; and these include recordings, traces and 
reports. In the classical paradigm, certainty is inscribed “out there” in 
the heart of things, and it is therefore also inscribed “out there” in the 
traces borne by things.  
In the quantum paradigm, however, the situation is quite different. 
The principle of quantum physics is prediction, not description. And 
not preduction of intrinsically occurring facts, but prediction of ever 
unaccomplished events, suspended to their joint creation by an 
experimental act. As Bernard d’Espagnat noticed long ago, “Within 
standard quantum mechanics, (there are) no ‘really existing’ facts”35. 
In the quantum paradigm, any claim about facts is suspended to a future 
experimental act. And even when facts are recorded, memorized, 
written down, etc. they are still suspended to future acts of deciphering 
records, retrieving memories, reading written marks etc. Decoherence, 
 
35 B. d’Espagnat, “Towards an empirical separable reality?”, Foundations of Physics, 20, 1147-
1172, 1990 
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that was aimed at restoring the classical certainty inscribed “out there”, 
has shown its in principle loophole in this respect. Last but not least, 
there is now a fresh wave of reflections, thought experiments (of 
Wigner’s type) 36 , and proposed laboratory experiments 37 , whose 
impressive teaching is that, to make sense of quantum predictions one 
must accept that even “facts are relative”38. 
The standard certainties of the life-world being thus no longer 
available, we must content ourselves with the bare certainty of 
transcendental consciousness. Once again, it looks like it is quantum 
physics itself that does not allow us to content ourselves with the life-
world reduction, and rather invites us to perform the transcendental 
reduction. 
 
Non-locality or transcendental reduction? 
 
Now, is there a situation, in quantum physics, where performing the 
transcendental reduction is not only an invitation but almost an 
obligation? Is there a situation, in quantum physics, where we have no 
other reasonable option than considering that “facts”, far from being 
absolute, far from having occurred by themselves in the past, are always 
suspended to future acts of bringing “them” out? I think there is such a 
situation. It is the dubious but widespread opinion according to which 
quantum mechanics implies “non-locality”.  
Why do I claim that the quantum non-locality is only an opinion? For 
the simple reason that Bell’s theorem, and the violation of Bell’s 
inequalities by quantum predictions, can be interpreted in at least two 
ways, and that one of these ways does not involve anything like non-
locality. As it is well known39, Bell’s inequalities (and every further 
inequalities of this kind) are derivable from two assumptions: (i) 
realism about micro-properties (or macro-properties)40, and (ii) locality 
of these properties. In this case, violation of such inequalities by 
quantum predictions and by experimental results fitting with quantum 
predictions, can be accounted for in two ways. Either there exist non-
 
36 Brukner (2018) 
37 Bong et al. (2020) 
38 Brukner (2020) 
39 D’Espagnat (1975) 
40 Some authors have challenged the necessity of the first assumption. See Laudisa (2019). But even 
though realism about microproperties is not indispensible to derive Bell’s inequalities, a weaker 
form of realism (realism about laboratory “facts”) is needed. See Bell (1981). The recent burst of 
challenges of the concept of “intrinsic” fact is a good confirmation that “fact-realism” is indeed a 
problematic assumption despite its looking innocently common sense. 
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local influences between micro-properties, or there is no such thing as 
an “intrinsically real” property. 
 It is only because the second option, namely property anti-realism, 
does not look attractive to many physicists, that the first option, namely 
non-locality, became so popular. Nevertheless, almost everything 
points towards the opposite direction. Bohr’s insistence on the 
contextuality of micro-properties and representations, clearly favors 
micro-property anti-realism. Moreover, it has been shown that the 
putative non-locality of quantum mechanics is purely formal; that non-
locality is just a projection in ontological terms of the symbolic form of 
entangled states. Indeed, the no-signalling theorem41 has demonstrated 
that the so-called non-locality has no observable consequence, that it 
implies no faster-than-light transfers of information. Not even the so-
called “quantum teleportation” can overcome this limitation, since it 
requires a classical (slower than light) canal of information.  
Yet, one could reply, aren’t quantum entangled states describing 
strict correlations between space-like separated events; and can’t these 
latter correlations be detected experimentally? Aren’t then such 
detected correlations sufficient evidence that quantum mechanics imply 
non-local effects? For, isn’t non-local causal influence the only 
plausible explanation of these correlations?  
Beware at this point: the very initial claim that correlations between 
space-like separated events are described by quantum mechanics can 
only arise from a descriptive, and therefore “realist”, construal of 
quantum states; and therefore, deriving the “reality” of correlations 
from this argument is a petitio principii. As for the further claim that 
correlations between space-like separated events are detected 
experimentally, it misses the obvious circumstance that such 
correlations can be brought out only much later, when the signals 
conveying the information about correlated events are no longer space-
like separated! Remember John Wheeler’s celebrated warning, that no 
phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon. 
Here, we must add: no correlation is a correlation until it is an observed 
correlation42. Quantum entangled states predict that a correlation will 
be observed in the future with a high probability; they do not describe 
or express the correlation, since the latter does not yet exist in any 
concrete sense of the verb “to exist”.  
This is the reason why QBists bluntly deny the so-called “quantum 
non-locality”. A single sentence suffices for them to blow out a whole 
 
41 Peres & Terno (2004) 
42 Bitbol (1983, 2015); Smerlak & Rovelli (2007) 
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tradition of wondering about the non-local “magics” of the quantum 
world: “There is no nonlocality in quantum theory; there are only some 
nonlocal interpretations of quantum mechanics”. QBism clearly does 
not belong to the subset of non-local interpretations, since it does not 
uphold anything like a “realist” view of quantum states. Since agents 
use quantum states to no other purpose than predicting correlations 
“between the manifold aspects of [their] experience”, and since agent’s 
lived experiences “cannot be space-like separated”, there is no such 
thing as a correlation between space-like separated events. To insist, 
“Quantum correlations, by their very nature, refer only to time-like 
separated events: the acquisition of experiences by any single agent”43.  
Here, the QBist option of performing a transcendental reduction 
straightaway, and avoiding the intermediate step of the life-world 
reduction, immediately manifests a momentous consequence. This 
consequence is a dissolution of all the conundrums associated with the 
putative non-locality of quantum mechanics. Indeed, from this 
standpoint, non-locality is just a fake descriptive projection of a 
mathematical property of the predictive symbol of quantum physics 
(entanglement, or non-factorizability, of the state vector). That this 
indeed represents a fake inference is strongly suggested, once again, by 
the lack of any possibility of faster-than-light communication.  
 
My conclusion is that nothing less than the most extreme 
transcendental reduction to the living present can allow us to dispel the 
joint enigmas of quantum correlations and quantum decoherence. 
Nothing less than the most extreme transcendental reduction to the 
living present can maintain a full conceptual coherence within the 
quantum paradigm. I then concur with QBists when they suggest that 
Bohr’s life-world reduction is not sufficient to make full sense of the 
quantum paradigm.  
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